101101s.ai AI Security Tool Selection
Document 1 of 4 · Coverage map

AI-era SSDLC and security tool coverage map

  • SSDLC phases P0–P9 mapped to NIST, CISA and OWASP sources.
  • 69 tool coverage capabilities in 10 domains: developer endpoint, code and artifacts, CI/CD, adversarial testing, cloud posture, runtime AI, MCP and tool governance, agentic workloads, infrastructure defense, AI governance.
As of October 2, 2026Prepared for enterprise security architecture & procurement

01What changed in the threat landscape

Developer endpoint incidents

  • GlassWorm (Oct 2025–Apr 2026): 72 VS Code / Open VSX extensions compromised.
  • Mini Shai-Hulud (May 2026): persistence through .claude session hooks and .vscode tasks.
  • s1ngularity/Nx (Aug 2025): local AI CLIs used to harvest credentials.
  • Amazon Q extension v1.84 (Jul 2025): shipped with an injected wiper prompt.

Security-toolchain compromises

  • TeamPCP (Feb–Mar 2026): trojanized Trivy, KICS and LiteLLM, then the Checkmarx/Bitwarden CLI path; target was AI API keys.
  • Mini Shai-Hulud: abused npm OIDC trusted publishing; malicious packages carried valid SLSA attestations.

CI/CD and AI-agent pipeline incidents

  • HackerBot-Claw (Feb 2026): autonomous bot; exploited pull_request_target and prompt-injected AI code reviewers.
  • prt-scan: 475 AI-crafted malicious PRs.

MCP and tool-layer incidents

  • Tool poisoning: 2025.
  • postmark-mcp (Sep 2025): first malicious MCP server observed in the wild; BCC'd every email.
  • ContextCrush (Mar 2026): poisoned docs MCP caused agents to read .env files.
  • EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711): zero-click exfiltration through indirect prompt injection.

Vulnerability volume and remediation windows

  • FIRST projection: about 66k CVEs in 2026.
  • AI-driven discovery programs: Project Glasswing, Big Sleep, XBOW, Codex Security. Time-to-exploit: about 5 days.
  • CISA BOD 26-04 (Jun 2026) replaced BOD 22-01; risk-based remediation windows of 3, 14 and 60 days.

AI-security acquisitions

  • Since 2024: Palo Alto, Cisco, Check Point, Zscaler, F5, SentinelOne, CrowdStrike, Cato, Fortinet and A10 each acquired an AI-security startup.
  • OpenAI acquired Promptfoo (Mar 2026).

02Framework spine

  • Source groups: NIST; CISA / US government; OWASP / community; other.
  • Status checked against primary or secondary sources as of October 2, 2026.
SourceStatus (Oct 2026)What it contributes to the SSDLC
NIST
SP 800-218 SSDF v1.1Final (Feb 2022)Core SSDLC practice spine: PO / PS / PW / RV
SP 800-218r1 (SSDF v1.2)Initial public draft, Dec 17 2025Adds PO.6 continuous improvement and PS.4 reliable updates (staged rollout, rollback)
SP 800-218A (GenAI / foundation model profile)Final (Jul 2024)PW.3 data integrity and poisoning checks, PS.1.2 protect training data, PS.1.3 protect weights, PO.5.3 monitor training environments
AI RMF 1.0 + AI 600-1 GenAI ProfileFinal; revision under wayGOVERN / MAP / MEASURE / MANAGE; MEASURE 2.7 security and resilience; MANAGE 4.1 post-deployment monitoring
AI 100-2 E2025 Adversarial ML taxonomyFinal (Mar 2025)Attack classes for threat modeling and red-team test design, including direct and indirect prompt injection against agents and RAG
SP 800-53 Rev 5 (Release 5.2.0)Final (Aug 2025)SA-11 developer testing, SR-3/4/11 supply chain, RA-5, SI-2, SI-7, CM-14
SP 800-204DFinal (Feb 2024)Supply-chain security in CI/CD: provenance, attestations, SBOM
SP 800-207 / 207AFinalZero trust; workload identity for cloud-native apps
CAISI agent-hijacking evaluationsPublished Jan 2025Method: multi-attempt adaptive attacks, task-specific success rates. Success rate: 81% adaptive vs 11% baseline.
NCCoE AI Agent Identity & AuthorizationConcept paper (Feb 2026)Agent identity and delegation; project scope not yet set
COSAiS (SP 800-53 overlays for AI)Discussion drafts onlyFive planned overlays, including single-agent and multi-agent. No agent overlay draft yet.
IR 8596 Cyber AI Profile (CSF 2.0)Preliminary draft (Dec 2025)Secure / Defend / Thwart framing for the security program
CISA / US government
Secure by Design pledgeActiveEliminate vulnerability classes, MFA, no default passwords, VDP, CVE/CWE accuracy, logging
Deploying AI Systems Securely (NSA/CISA)Apr 2024Validate models before use (hashes, signatures), protect weights, AI-specific logging, red teaming
AI Data SecurityMay 2025Data provenance, integrity, poisoning and drift across the data supply chain
Careful Adoption of Agentic AI ServicesMay 1 2026Five agent risk classes. Lifecycle guidance covers instruction hierarchy, agent identity, adversarial testing, incremental privilege, short-lived credentials and anomaly monitoring.
2026 Minimum Elements for an SBOMFinal (Jul 2026)Adds hash, license, tool name and generation context. Scope includes AI software and SaaS.
AI SBOM minimum elements (CISA + G7)May 2026AIBOM clusters: models, datasets, infrastructure, security properties, KPIs
BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security UpdatesJun 2026 (supersedes BOD 22-01)Risk-based remediation windows: 3 days (exposed + KEV), 14, 60
OMB M-26-05Jan 2026Rescinds mandatory SSDF attestation; agencies validate on a risk basis
OWASP / community
Top 10 for LLM Applications2025 edition; 2026 edition published Aug 2026Test catalog for LLM apps. Crosswalk 2025 → 2026 in §06.
Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI01–ASI10)Dec 2025Agent goal hijack, tool misuse, identity/privilege abuse, agentic supply chain, RCE, memory poisoning, inter-agent comms, cascading failures, human trust, rogue agents
MCP Top 10Beta (Phase 3)Token exposure, scope creep, tool poisoning, supply chain, command injection, shadow MCP servers, telemetry
AI Testing Guide v1 / GenAI Red Teaming GuideNov 2025 / Jan 2025Test methodology pillars: APP, MOD, INF, DAT
AIVSSv0.8Vulnerability scoring for agentic and AI findings
Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks2022CICD-SEC-1…10: poisoned pipeline execution, dependency chain abuse, credential hygiene, artifact integrity
ASVS 5.0 / SAMM 2.0 / SCVSMay 2025 / 2020 / 2020Requirements baseline, program maturity, component verification
CycloneDX 1.6–1.7 (ML-BOM) / SPDX 3.0 AI profileECMA-424 / ISO in progressSBOM and AIBOM formats
Other
MITRE ATLASv2026.06, 16 tacticsAdversary TTPs for AI; includes Agentic AI as a platform
SLSA v1.2Nov 2025Build Track L1–L3 plus new Source Track
EU AI ActGPAI enforcement from Aug 2 2026Art. 50 transparency in effect. Under the Digital Omnibus agreement, Annex III high-risk moves to Dec 2027 and Annex I to Aug 2028.
ISO/IEC 42001 / 420052023 / 2025AI management system; AI impact assessment
  • OMB M-26-05 (Jan 2026): federal procurement moved from signed SSDF attestation to risk-based validation.

03SSDLC phase map

  • 10 phases: P0–P9.
  • AI-specific additions to the SSDF lifecycle: P3 Data & model sourcing; agent and tool controls in P2, P7 and P8.
  • d = draft.
P0Governcontinuous
P1Plan & require
P2Design & threat model
P3Data & model sourcingAI-specific
P4Developendpoint + code
P5Build & CI/CD
P6Test & verifyadversarial testing
P7Release & deploy
P8Operate & monitorruntime
P9Respond & improve
PhaseControl objectiveNISTCISA / govOWASPOtherTool coverage areas
P0 GovernAI and AppSec policy, roles, AI inventory, risk appetite, metricsSSDF PO.1, PO.2, PO.6d; AI RMF GOVERN 1.x, 6.x; IR 8596dSecure by Design principles; M-26-05 inventory dutySAMM GovernanceISO 42001; EU AI Act GPAI and Art. 50AI inventory & risk tiering, AI-SPM discovery feed, regulatory mapping
P1 Plan & requireClassify each use case (predictive, GenAI, agent). Set security requirements for AI, agents and third-party models.SSDF PO.1.1–1.3 (218A PO.1.3); AI RMF MAP 1.1, 2.x, 4.1; AI 600-1 risk listAgentic guidance: start with low-risk tasksASVS 5.0; LLM06 / ASI03 drive scopingISO 42005 impact assessmentRequirements templates, third-party AI risk intake
P2 Design & threat modelThreat model the app, model, data, agents and tools. Design zero-trust identity and an instruction hierarchy.SSDF PW.1, PW.2; AI 100-2 E2025; SP 800-207/207A; 800-53 SA-8, SA-17, AC-6Careful Adoption of Agentic AI (design); Deploying AI Systems SecurelyLLM01/06/07/08; ASI01/03/07/08/09; MCP02/07/10MITRE ATLASAI threat-modeling tools, agent identity design, MCP gateway architecture
P3 Data & model sourcingData provenance and poisoning checks; protect weights and training data; vet pre-trained models and MCP servers.218A PW.3.1–3.3, PS.1.2, PS.1.3; AI RMF MAP 4.1, MANAGE 3.2AI Data Security; AI SBOM elementsLLM03, LLM04; ASI04, ASI06; MCP03, MCP04CycloneDX ML-BOM; SPDX 3.0 AI / DatasetModel scanning, AIBOM, dataset provenance, MCP registry vetting
P4 DevelopSecure coding (human and AI-generated), secret hygiene, safe defaults, output handling, a controlled developer endpointSSDF PO.3, PO.5, PW.4–PW.6, PW.9; 218A PO.5.3; 800-53 SI-10Secure by Design: eliminate vulnerability classesASVS V1/V2/V4/V8/V15; LLM05; ASI05; MCP01/05OpenSSF ScorecardIDE/extension control, package firewall, pre-commit secrets and SAST, coding-agent policy
P5 Build & CI/CDHardened pipeline, provenance, signing, SBOM and AIBOM, dependency controlSSDF PS.1–PS.3; SP 800-204D; 800-53 SR-3/4/11, CM-14, SI-72026 SBOM minimum elements; AI SBOM elementsCICD-SEC-1…10; SCVSSLSA v1.2; SigstoreSCA, malicious-package detection, SBOM, runner hardening, provenance, ASPM
P6 Test & verifySAST, DAST and SCA, plus AI adversarial testing, agent-hijacking tests and guardrail validationSSDF PW.7, PW.8; 218A PW.3.3; AI RMF MEASURE 2.7; CAISI method; 800-53 SA-11, RA-5Agentic guidance: adversarial testing during developmentAI Testing Guide; GenAI Red Teaming Guide; LLM Top 10; ASI Top 10ATLAS TTPsAI red teaming platform, MCP dynamic testing, DAST/API, AI pentest
P7 Release & deployGated release, staged rollout, rollback, guardrails, least-privilege agent credentialsSSDF PS.4d, PW.9; 800-53 SI-2, SI-7; 800-207ADeploying AI Systems Securely: validate before useASI02/03; MCP02/07/09; LLM10SLSA verification at admissionAdmission policy, AI firewall, MCP gateway, agent identity and OBO authorization
P8 Operate & monitorRuntime protection, drift, agent telemetry, abuse detection, deception218A PO.5.3; AI RMF MANAGE 4.1; 800-53 SI-4, AU-2, AU-12, CA-7Agentic guidance: logging and anomaly monitoringMCP08; ASI08/10; LLM09/10; CICD-SEC-10ATLAS detectionsAgent detection & response, agent observability, AI SOC, honeytokens, continuous red teaming
P9 Respond & improveVulnerability intake, AI-aware scoring, patch SLAs, root cause, disclosureSSDF RV.1–RV.3, PO.6.3d; AI RMF MANAGE 4.3; 800-53 IR-4, SI-2BOD 26-04; KEV; Secure by Design VDPAIVSS; SAMM Incident MgmtEU AI Act incident reportingVM and patch automation, remediation ops, AI incident playbooks
  • P3 Data & model sourcing: separate phase; contains 218A PW.3, PS.1.2, PS.1.3, CISA AI Data Security, LLM04 and ASI06.
  • Agent and MCP identity: placed in P2 (design). Government sources: CISA agentic guidance (May 2026), SP 800-207A. NCCoE agent identity: concept paper (Feb 2026). COSAiS agent overlays: no draft.

04Security tool coverage catalog

  • 69 capabilities, domains A–J.
  • Filters: keyword, maturity, new vs extend, priority.
  • D1 (adversarial testing): detailed in doc 2.
69

capabilities, 10 domains

40

New tool categories; 29 Extend

42

P1 (next 12 months)

12

Gap maturity (no mature product category)

  • Maturity: Mature several products · Emerging products under 3 years old or consolidating · Gap DIY or immature OSS.
  • New / Extend: New new tool category · Extend existing control extended to AI assets.
  • Priority: P1 next 12 months · P2 12–24 months · P3 opportunistic.
IDCapabilityThreat / purposePhaseFramework anchorsRepresentative vendors / OSSMaturityNew / ExtendPriority
A · Developer endpoint & IDE
A1IDE extension allowlisting & private marketplaceMalicious or hijacked VS Code/Open VSX extensions (GlassWorm). Cursor and Windsurf use Open VSX.P4SSDF PO.3, PO.5; 800-53 CM-7; ASI04Microsoft VS Code Private Marketplace + extensions.allowed; Palo Alto (Koi) Agentic Endpoint Security; Socket (Secure Annex)EmergingNewP1
A2Extension, plugin & agent-skill reputation scanningUnscanned agent skills, plugins and rules-file packs; transitive extension dependenciesP4ASI04; MCP04; CICD-SEC-3Socket; Palo Alto (Koi); StepSecurity Dev Machine GuardGapNewP1
A3AI coding-assistant policy enforcementUncontrolled agent permissions, auto-run, unapproved MCP servers and models on developer machinesP4ASI02, ASI03; CISA agentic guidance (least privilege)Claude Code managed settings / managed MCP; GitHub Copilot enterprise policy; Cursor enterprise; delivered by MDMEmergingNewP1
A4Repo-borne prompt-injection scanningHidden instructions in AGENTS.md, .cursorrules, issues and docs feeds that hijack coding agents (rules-file backdoor, ContextCrush)P4LLM01; ASI01; MCP06Pillar (AI coding agents); Snyk agent-scan; custom Semgrep rulesGapNewP1
A5Package firewall / curated registry proxyDevelopers pulling packages straight from npm/PyPI; worm-propagated malware (Shai-Hulud)P4–P5SSDF PW.4; 800-53 SR-3, SR-11; CICD-SEC-3JFrog Curation; Sonatype Repository Firewall; Socket Firewall (sfw); Chainguard LibrariesMatureExtendP1
A6Block direct internet software downloads & app allowlistingUnvetted binaries, CLIs, model files and AI desktop apps installed from the internetP4800-53 CM-7(5), CM-11; SSDF PO.5macOS: Santa / Jamf Protect; Windows: App Control for Business (WDAC); EDR application control; SSE download policy (Zscaler, Netskope)MatureExtendP2
A7Pre-commit secret scanningAPI keys (especially AI provider keys) committed to repos; harvested by wormsP4SSDF PS.1; CICD-SEC-6; MCP01gitleaks; GitGuardian ggshield; TruffleHog; GitHub push protectionMatureExtendP1
A8IDE / pre-commit SASTVulnerable code from humans and AI assistants caught before reviewP4SSDF PW.7; ASVSSemgrep; Snyk; Endor Labs AURI (MCP to agents); GitHub Copilot AutofixMatureExtendP2
A9Endpoint AI agent & local MCP inventoryShadow MCP servers over stdio bypass network gateways; unknown AI clientsP4, P8MCP09; ASI04Runlayer AI Watch; Noma endpoint; StepSecurity Dev Machine Guard; Snyk agent-scanEmergingNewP1
A10Developer credential hardeningLong-lived tokens in ~/.npmrc, .env and cloud CLIs; AI keys exfiltrated by s1ngularity-style payloadsP4CICD-SEC-6; 800-53 IA-51Password / Vault dev secrets; short-lived SSO-backed CLI credentials; AembitMatureExtendP1
A11Isolated dev environments for coding agentsCoding agents running with full laptop privileges and network accessP4ASI05; CISA agentic guidanceDev containers / GitHub Codespaces; E2B; Daytona; agent sandbox modesEmergingNewP2
B · Code, composition & artifacts
B1SAST incl. AI-native code reviewLogic and authorization flaws in high-volume AI-generated codeP4–P6SSDF PW.7; 800-53 SA-11Semgrep; Snyk; Checkmarx; Veracode; GitHub CodeQL; Corgea; DryRun; OpenAI Codex SecurityMatureExtendP1
B2Secrets scanning (history + push protection)Secrets across repo history, CI logs and container layersP4–P5CICD-SEC-6; MCP01GitHub Secret Protection; GitGuardian; TruffleHogMatureExtendP1
B3SCA with reachabilityKnown-vulnerable dependencies; triage overload from AI-scale CVE volumeP5SSDF PW.4, RV.1; 800-53 RA-5Endor Labs; Snyk; Socket (Coana); GitHub Dependabot; AikidoMatureExtendP1
B4Malicious package detectionTyposquats, account takeovers, self-propagating wormsP4–P5CICD-SEC-3; SR-11Socket; JFrog Xray; Sonatype; Veracode (Phylum)MatureExtendP1
B5OSS inclusion & license policyUnapproved OSS and model licenses (including model weights' terms of use)P1, P5SSDF PW.4; SCVS V5Sonatype; FOSSA; Snyk; Black DuckMatureExtendP2
B6SBOM generation & managementInventory and continuous vulnerability matching; CISA 2026 minimum elementsP5, P9SSDF PS.3.2; CISA 2026 SBOM; SCVS V2Syft/Grype (Anchore); cdxgen; OWASP Dependency-TrackMatureExtendP1
B7AIBOM / ML-BOMInventory of models, datasets, adapters, prompts, MCP servers and agent configsP3, P5218A PS.3.2; CISA/G7 AI SBOM; CycloneDX ML-BOM; SPDX 3.0 AICisco AI Defense (AI BOM); Snyk Evo AI-BOM; Mindgard; Cranium; Wiz AI-SPMGapNewP2
B8Model file scanning & model signingPickle / serialization payloads, backdoored or swapped weights from public hubsP3, P5218A PS.1.3; Deploying AI Systems Securely; LLM03Prisma AIRS AI Model Security (Protect AI Guardian); HiddenLayer; JFrog AI Catalog; ModelScan; picklescan; OpenSSF model-signingEmergingNewP1
B9Dataset provenance & poisoning checksPoisoned training, fine-tuning or RAG corpora; split-view poisoningP3218A PW.3.1–3.3; CISA AI Data Security; LLM04; ASI06DSPM (Cyera, Varonis) for stores; mostly custom pipelinesGapNewP2
B10Container & artifact scanning; hardened imagesVulnerable base images and model-serving containersP5SSDF PW.4; 800-53 RA-5Chainguard Images; Echo (Minimus); Wiz; Prisma Cloud; GrypeMatureExtendP1
B11IaC scanningMisconfigured cloud, GPU and AI services as codeP4–P5SSDF PW.9; 800-53 CM-6Checkov; Trivy; KICS (KICS and Trivy compromised by TeamPCP, Feb–Mar 2026)MatureExtendP2
B12AI-generated code governanceProvenance of AI-authored changes; review policy; agent-authored PRsP4SSDF PO.1; PW.7Apiiro; Legit; GitHub rulesets; agent commit attributionEmergingNewP2
C · Pipeline (CI/CD) security & observability
C1CI/CD posture & workflow scanningpull_request_target abuse, unpinned actions, over-scoped tokensP5CICD-SEC-1, 4, 5, 7; Scorecardzizmor; OpenSSF Scorecard; StepSecurity; Cycode; LegitMatureExtendP1
C2Runner hardening & egress controlSecret exfiltration from runners (tj-actions); cache poisoningP5SP 800-204D; CICD-SEC-6, 10StepSecurity Harden-Runner; ephemeral self-hosted runnersEmergingExtendP1
C3Build provenance & signingTampered artifacts; OIDC trusted publishing abused by Mini Shai-HuludP5SLSA v1.2; SSDF PS.2, PS.3; 800-53 SR-4Sigstore; GitHub artifact attestations; npm/PyPI trusted publishing; in-totoMatureExtendP1
C4Deploy-time admission verificationUnsigned or unprovenanced images and models reaching productionP7SSDF PS.2; CM-14; SLSA verifyKyverno; OPA Gatekeeper; Sigstore policy-controllerMatureExtendP2
C5Pipeline secrets & OIDC federationLong-lived cloud and registry credentials in CIP5CICD-SEC-6; 800-53 IA-5OIDC to cloud; Vault; GitHub environmentsMatureExtendP1
C6Governance of AI agents inside CIPrompt injection through PR or issue text into Claude Code Action / Copilot agent, reaching secretsP5ASI01, ASI02; CICD-SEC-4Least-privilege tokens + Harden-Runner; no dedicated product yetGapNewP1
C7Artifact, model & MCP registry governanceUngoverned binaries, models and MCP servers entering buildsP3, P5SSDF PS.3; SCVS V4JFrog Artifactory + AI Catalog + MCP Registry; Sonatype Nexus; Hugging Face Enterprise HubEmergingExtendP2
C8ASPM / risk correlationToo many findings across too many tools; no code-to-runtime contextP5–P9SAMM Defect MgmtApiiro; Cycode; ArmorCode; Legit; Snyk EvoMatureExtendP3
C9Pipeline audit & observabilityNo forensic trail for pipeline compromiseP5, P8CICD-SEC-10; 800-53 AU-2SCM audit logs to SIEM; StepSecurity; CriblMatureExtendP2
D · Adversarial testing & verification
D1AI adversarial testing / red teamingPrompt injection, jailbreak, data exfiltration, tool misuse and goal hijack in LLM apps and agents before release, plus regression on every changeP6, P8AI RMF MEASURE 2.7; 218A PW.3.3; CAISI; OWASP AI Testing Guide; GenAI Red Teaming Guide; LLM Top 10; ASI Top 10See doc 2: Pillar, Straiker, Mindgard, Repello, Prisma AIRS, Zscaler (SPLX), F5, Cisco; OSS promptfoo, PyRIT, garak, DeepTeamEmergingNewP1
D2Model evaluation (safety, bias, robustness)Model selection and model swaps change riskP3, P6AI RMF MEASURE 2.3–2.11; AI 600-1Inspect (UK AISI); Giskard; Holistic AI; Arize (Dynatrace); Galileo (Cisco)EmergingNewP2
D3DAST / API security testingClassic web and API flaws around the AI app (authz, SSRF, injection)P6SSDF PW.8; ASVSBurp Suite; StackHawk; Invicti; Salt Security; Akamai API SecurityMatureExtendP1
D4MCP server dynamic testing & fuzzingCommand injection, auth flaws and rug pulls in MCP serversP3, P6MCP03, MCP05, MCP07Enkrypt (Anaconda) MCP scan; Cisco MCP Scanner; mcplint / mcpfuzz (immature)GapNewP2
D5AI-assisted pentest & exploit validationExploitability validation; false-positive reductionP6, P9800-53 CA-8; RA-5XBOW; Codex Security; Mythos-class programs (partner-gated)EmergingNewP3
E · Cloud & infrastructure posture
E1CNAPP / CSPM / KSPMCloud misconfiguration and toxic combinationsP7–P8800-53 CM-6, RA-5Wiz (Google); Cortex Cloud (Palo Alto); Orca; Microsoft Defender for Cloud; Upwind; SysdigMatureExtendP1
E2AI-SPMExposed model endpoints, vector DBs and Bedrock/Vertex/Foundry agents; over-permissioned AI identitiesP7–P8AI RMF MAP 4.1; MCP09Wiz AI-SPM; Cortex Cloud AI-SPM; Orca; Defender for Cloud / Agent 365EmergingNewP1
E3GPU & model-serving infrastructure hardeningContainer escape on shared GPUs (NVIDIAScape), exposed Ray/vLLM/Triton, KV-cache leakageP7–P8800-53 SC-39, SI-2CNAPP runtime agents + vendor patching; no dedicated categoryGapNewP2
E4DSPM for AI data storesSensitive data in training sets, RAG indexes and prompt logsP3, P8CISA AI Data Security; LLM02Cyera; Varonis; Sentra; Wiz DSPMEmergingExtendP2
F · Runtime AI security
F1AI firewall / guardrailsPrompt injection, jailbreaks, PII and secret leakage, toxic output at runtimeP7–P8LLM01, 02, 05; AI RMF MANAGE 2.xPrisma AIRS; Check Point AI Guardrails (Lakera); Cisco AI Defense; F5 AI Guardrails; CrowdStrike Falcon AIDR; Cloudflare Firewall for AI; NeMo Guardrails; Llama Guard / Prompt GuardEmergingNewP1
F2LLM / AI gatewayCentral routing, keys, rate and cost limits, logging, model allowlistP7–P8LLM10; MCP08Portkey (Palo Alto); Kong AI Gateway; Cloudflare AI Gateway; LiteLLM (compromised by TeamPCP, Feb–Mar 2026)EmergingNewP1
F3Shadow AI & workforce AI usage controlSensitive data pasted into unsanctioned AI apps; unknown AI SaaSP8AI RMF GOVERN 6.1; LLM02SentinelOne (Prompt Security); Harmonic; WitnessAI; Akamai (LayerX); Island; Netskope; Zscaler; Cato (Aim)EmergingNewP1
F4RAG / vector store access controlCross-tenant retrieval, embedding inversion, permission-unaware retrievalP2, P7LLM08; ASI06Permission-aware retrieval in app code; OpenFGA / Cedar; Pinecone / Weaviate RBACGapNewP2
G · MCP, gateway & tool governance
G1MCP gateway / proxyUnauthenticated tools, no audit, no central allow/denyP7–P8MCP02, 07, 08, 09; ASI02Docker MCP Gateway; Cloudflare MCP Server Portals; Kong; agentgateway (LF); IBM ContextForge; Microsoft MCP Gateway; Runlayer; Obot; Lasso; OperantEmergingNewP1
G2Private MCP registry & server vettingTyposquatted or malicious servers (postmark-mcp); unvetted community serversP3, P7MCP04; ASI04JFrog MCP Registry; Docker MCP Catalog; Cisco MCP Catalog; official MCP Registry (subregistry)EmergingNewP1
G3MCP tool-description scanning & pinningTool poisoning; rug pulls (description changes after approval)P3, P8MCP03, MCP06Snyk agent-scan; Cisco MCP Scanner; EnkryptEmergingNewP1
G4Fine-grained tool-call authorizationAgent calls a permitted tool with harmful arguments or resourcesP2, P7ASI02, ASI03; MCP02Cedar; OpenFGA; Permit.io; Oso; Cerbos (mostly DIY today)GapNewP1
H · Agentic workload security
H1Agent & workload identityAgents sharing human or service credentials; no attributionP2, P7SP 800-207A; NCCoE agent identity; ASI03SPIFFE/SPIRE; Microsoft Entra Agent ID; Okta for AI Agents; Aembit; Astrix (Cisco)EmergingNewP1
H2On-behalf-of (delegated) authorizationConfused deputy; agents exceed the invoking user's rightsP2, P7RFC 8693 token exchange; ID-JAG (draft); ASI03Okta Cross App Access (GA Aug 2026); Auth0 for AI Agents; Descope; Entra OBOEmergingNewP1
H3Secretless credential brokeringStatic API keys in agent configs and promptsP7MCP01; CICD-SEC-6Aembit; Auth0 Token Vault; Vault dynamic secretsEmergingNewP2
H4Human-in-the-loop approval for high-impact actionsIrreversible agent actions without consent; human trust exploitationP2, P7ASI09; CISA agentic guidanceOAuth CIBA (Auth0, Descope); framework interrupts (LangGraph, OpenAI Agents SDK)EmergingNewP1
H5Agent observability & tracingNo evidence trail of prompts, tool calls and decisionsP8MCP08; AI RMF MANAGE 4.1; OTel GenAI semconv (still in development)Langfuse; Arize (Dynatrace); LangSmith; Datadog LLM Obs; OTelEmergingNewP1
H6Agent detection & response (AIDR)Goal hijack, rogue agents and anomalous tool chains at runtimeP8ASI01, ASI08, ASI10Zenity; Noma; Straiker Defend AI; Operant; Pillar; Lasso; CrowdStrike Falcon AIDREmergingNewP1
H7Sandboxed code & tool executionAgent-generated code runs with host privileges (ASI05)P7–P8ASI05; LLM05E2B (Firecracker); Modal (gVisor); Northflank; Cloudflare Sandbox; gVisor / Kata / FirecrackerEmergingNewP1
H8Agent egress controlExfiltration through tool calls, markdown images and URL fetchesP7–P8LLM02; ASI02SSE / SWG egress policy; sandbox network policy; MCP gatewayGapNewP1
H9Agent inventory & AgBOMAgent sprawl across SaaS copilots, frameworks and endpointsP0, P8OWASP Agent Control Standard; MCP09Microsoft Agent 365; Zenity; Noma; ServiceNow AI Control TowerEmergingNewP1
I · Infrastructure defense
I1Network defense, segmentation & NDRLateral movement from compromised agents and inference hostsP8SP 800-207; 800-53 SC-7, SI-4Zscaler / Palo Alto / Cloudflare ZT; Illumio; Darktrace; Vectra; ExtraHopMatureExtendP2
I2Risk-based vulnerability managementAI-scale CVE volume; prioritization by exposure and KEVP9BOD 26-04; KEV; 800-53 RA-5Tenable; Qualys; Rapid7; CrowdStrike Exposure MgmtMatureExtendP1
I3Patch automation & remediation opsAbout 5-day time-to-exploit against a 361-day median to remediate half of exposed vulnsP9SSDF RV.2; 800-53 SI-2Automox; Vicarius vRx; Zafran; Seemplicity; Aikido (Root) backportsEmergingExtendP1
I4EASM & AI-driven external threat monitoringExposed AI endpoints, leaked AI keys, brand and agent impersonationP8800-53 RA-5(11), SI-4CrowdStrike; Palo Alto Cortex Xpanse; Censys; SecurityScorecard; InfobloxMatureExtendP2
I5AI deception: honeypots & honeytokensDetect hijacked agents and AI-driven attackers by planting decoy tools, MCP servers and credentialsP8MITRE Engage; ATLASThinkst Canary; Acalvio Deception Guardrails; Tracebit; Beelzebub (OSS LLM/MCP honeypot); GalahGapNewP2
I6AI SOC & anomaly detectionAlert volume; machine-speed attacksP8–P9800-53 IR-4, SI-4Dropzone; Prophet; Torq; Exaforce; 7AI; Darktrace; VectraEmergingNewP2
I7AI-powered vulnerability discovery (defender use)Defender-side AI vulnerability discoveryP6, P9SSDF RV.1Google Big Sleep / CodeMender; XBOW; Codex Security; Project Glasswing (partner-gated)EmergingNewP3
J · AI governance & posture
J1AI inventory & risk tieringUnknown models, agents and AI vendors; inventory driftP0AI RMF GOVERN; ISO 42001; M-26-05 inventoryCredo AI; Cranium; OneTrust; ServiceNow AI Control Tower; Varonis (AllTrue)EmergingNewP1
J2Regulatory control mappingEU AI Act, NIST AI RMF and ISO 42001 evidenceP0EU AI Act; ISO 42001 / 42005Credo AI; Holistic AI; OneTrustEmergingNewP2
J3AI vulnerability scoring & AI incident responseCVSS does not capture agentic impact; no AI playbooksP9OWASP AIVSS; AI RMF MANAGE 4.3AIVSS calculator; SOAR playbooksGapNewP2
J4Third-party AI / model provider riskAI features embedded in SaaS; model provider terms and data useP1AI RMF GOVERN 6.1; 218A PO.1.3TPRM suites (OneTrust, Whistic) + AI questionnairesEmergingExtendP2

05Funding sequence

HorizonFundBasis
0–6 monthsA1/A3/A9 endpoint AI and extension control · A5 package firewall · C1/C2/C6 CI hardening · D1 adversarial testing · G1/G2/G3 MCP gateway, registry and scanning · F3 shadow AI · H5 agent tracingIncidents in §01: developer endpoints (GlassWorm, Mini Shai-Hulud, s1ngularity), CI (HackerBot-Claw, prt-scan), tool layer (postmark-mcp, ContextCrush).
6–12 monthsH1/H2 agent identity + OBO · G4 tool-call authorization · H6 AIDR · H7 sandboxes · F1/F2 runtime guardrails + gateway · E2 AI-SPM · B8 model scanning · I3 patch automationDepends on 0–6 month inventory and testing. Okta Cross App Access GA Aug 2026; Entra Agent ID GA May 2026.
12–24 monthsB7 AIBOM · B9 dataset provenance · D4 MCP fuzzing · E3 GPU hardening · I5 AI deception · J3 AIVSS-based responseMaturity: Gap (B7, B9, D4, E3, I5, J3). Pending standards: AIVSS 1.0 (current v0.8), COSAiS agent overlays (no draft).

06OWASP LLM Top 10: 2025 → 2026 crosswalk

2025 ID2025 name2026 ID2026 name
LLM01Prompt InjectionLLM01Prompt Injection
LLM02Sensitive Information DisclosureLLM02Sensitive Information Disclosure
LLM03Supply ChainLLM04Supply Chain
LLM04Data and Model PoisoningLLM05Data and Model Poisoning
LLM05Improper Output HandlingLLM10Improper Output Handling
LLM06Excessive AgencyLLM03Excessive Agency
LLM07System Prompt LeakageLLM08Hidden Context Exposure (renamed, broader scope)
LLM08Vector and Embedding WeaknessesLLM09Vector and Embedding Weaknesses
LLM09MisinformationLLM07Misinformation
LLM10Unbounded ConsumptionLLM06Unbounded Consumption
  • 2026 edition: published August 2026; rankings weighted partly on incident data.
  • IDs used in these docs: 2025 edition, the IDs vendor tooling maps to.

07Sources