Document 1 of 4 · Coverage map
AI-era SSDLC and security tool coverage map
- SSDLC phases P0–P9 mapped to NIST, CISA and OWASP sources.
- 69 tool coverage capabilities in 10 domains: developer endpoint, code and artifacts, CI/CD, adversarial testing, cloud posture, runtime AI, MCP and tool governance, agentic workloads, infrastructure defense, AI governance.
01What changed in the threat landscape
Developer endpoint incidents
- GlassWorm (Oct 2025–Apr 2026): 72 VS Code / Open VSX extensions compromised.
- Mini Shai-Hulud (May 2026): persistence through
.claudesession hooks and.vscodetasks. - s1ngularity/Nx (Aug 2025): local AI CLIs used to harvest credentials.
- Amazon Q extension v1.84 (Jul 2025): shipped with an injected wiper prompt.
Security-toolchain compromises
- TeamPCP (Feb–Mar 2026): trojanized Trivy, KICS and LiteLLM, then the Checkmarx/Bitwarden CLI path; target was AI API keys.
- Mini Shai-Hulud: abused npm OIDC trusted publishing; malicious packages carried valid SLSA attestations.
CI/CD and AI-agent pipeline incidents
- HackerBot-Claw (Feb 2026): autonomous bot; exploited
pull_request_targetand prompt-injected AI code reviewers. - prt-scan: 475 AI-crafted malicious PRs.
MCP and tool-layer incidents
- Tool poisoning: 2025.
- postmark-mcp (Sep 2025): first malicious MCP server observed in the wild; BCC'd every email.
- ContextCrush (Mar 2026): poisoned docs MCP caused agents to read
.envfiles. - EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711): zero-click exfiltration through indirect prompt injection.
Vulnerability volume and remediation windows
- FIRST projection: about 66k CVEs in 2026.
- AI-driven discovery programs: Project Glasswing, Big Sleep, XBOW, Codex Security. Time-to-exploit: about 5 days.
- CISA BOD 26-04 (Jun 2026) replaced BOD 22-01; risk-based remediation windows of 3, 14 and 60 days.
AI-security acquisitions
- Since 2024: Palo Alto, Cisco, Check Point, Zscaler, F5, SentinelOne, CrowdStrike, Cato, Fortinet and A10 each acquired an AI-security startup.
- OpenAI acquired Promptfoo (Mar 2026).
02Framework spine
- Source groups: NIST; CISA / US government; OWASP / community; other.
- Status checked against primary or secondary sources as of October 2, 2026.
| Source | Status (Oct 2026) | What it contributes to the SSDLC |
|---|---|---|
| NIST | ||
| SP 800-218 SSDF v1.1 | Final (Feb 2022) | Core SSDLC practice spine: PO / PS / PW / RV |
| SP 800-218r1 (SSDF v1.2) | Initial public draft, Dec 17 2025 | Adds PO.6 continuous improvement and PS.4 reliable updates (staged rollout, rollback) |
| SP 800-218A (GenAI / foundation model profile) | Final (Jul 2024) | PW.3 data integrity and poisoning checks, PS.1.2 protect training data, PS.1.3 protect weights, PO.5.3 monitor training environments |
| AI RMF 1.0 + AI 600-1 GenAI Profile | Final; revision under way | GOVERN / MAP / MEASURE / MANAGE; MEASURE 2.7 security and resilience; MANAGE 4.1 post-deployment monitoring |
| AI 100-2 E2025 Adversarial ML taxonomy | Final (Mar 2025) | Attack classes for threat modeling and red-team test design, including direct and indirect prompt injection against agents and RAG |
| SP 800-53 Rev 5 (Release 5.2.0) | Final (Aug 2025) | SA-11 developer testing, SR-3/4/11 supply chain, RA-5, SI-2, SI-7, CM-14 |
| SP 800-204D | Final (Feb 2024) | Supply-chain security in CI/CD: provenance, attestations, SBOM |
| SP 800-207 / 207A | Final | Zero trust; workload identity for cloud-native apps |
| CAISI agent-hijacking evaluations | Published Jan 2025 | Method: multi-attempt adaptive attacks, task-specific success rates. Success rate: 81% adaptive vs 11% baseline. |
| NCCoE AI Agent Identity & Authorization | Concept paper (Feb 2026) | Agent identity and delegation; project scope not yet set |
| COSAiS (SP 800-53 overlays for AI) | Discussion drafts only | Five planned overlays, including single-agent and multi-agent. No agent overlay draft yet. |
| IR 8596 Cyber AI Profile (CSF 2.0) | Preliminary draft (Dec 2025) | Secure / Defend / Thwart framing for the security program |
| CISA / US government | ||
| Secure by Design pledge | Active | Eliminate vulnerability classes, MFA, no default passwords, VDP, CVE/CWE accuracy, logging |
| Deploying AI Systems Securely (NSA/CISA) | Apr 2024 | Validate models before use (hashes, signatures), protect weights, AI-specific logging, red teaming |
| AI Data Security | May 2025 | Data provenance, integrity, poisoning and drift across the data supply chain |
| Careful Adoption of Agentic AI Services | May 1 2026 | Five agent risk classes. Lifecycle guidance covers instruction hierarchy, agent identity, adversarial testing, incremental privilege, short-lived credentials and anomaly monitoring. |
| 2026 Minimum Elements for an SBOM | Final (Jul 2026) | Adds hash, license, tool name and generation context. Scope includes AI software and SaaS. |
| AI SBOM minimum elements (CISA + G7) | May 2026 | AIBOM clusters: models, datasets, infrastructure, security properties, KPIs |
| BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates | Jun 2026 (supersedes BOD 22-01) | Risk-based remediation windows: 3 days (exposed + KEV), 14, 60 |
| OMB M-26-05 | Jan 2026 | Rescinds mandatory SSDF attestation; agencies validate on a risk basis |
| OWASP / community | ||
| Top 10 for LLM Applications | 2025 edition; 2026 edition published Aug 2026 | Test catalog for LLM apps. Crosswalk 2025 → 2026 in §06. |
| Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI01–ASI10) | Dec 2025 | Agent goal hijack, tool misuse, identity/privilege abuse, agentic supply chain, RCE, memory poisoning, inter-agent comms, cascading failures, human trust, rogue agents |
| MCP Top 10 | Beta (Phase 3) | Token exposure, scope creep, tool poisoning, supply chain, command injection, shadow MCP servers, telemetry |
| AI Testing Guide v1 / GenAI Red Teaming Guide | Nov 2025 / Jan 2025 | Test methodology pillars: APP, MOD, INF, DAT |
| AIVSS | v0.8 | Vulnerability scoring for agentic and AI findings |
| Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks | 2022 | CICD-SEC-1…10: poisoned pipeline execution, dependency chain abuse, credential hygiene, artifact integrity |
| ASVS 5.0 / SAMM 2.0 / SCVS | May 2025 / 2020 / 2020 | Requirements baseline, program maturity, component verification |
| CycloneDX 1.6–1.7 (ML-BOM) / SPDX 3.0 AI profile | ECMA-424 / ISO in progress | SBOM and AIBOM formats |
| Other | ||
| MITRE ATLAS | v2026.06, 16 tactics | Adversary TTPs for AI; includes Agentic AI as a platform |
| SLSA v1.2 | Nov 2025 | Build Track L1–L3 plus new Source Track |
| EU AI Act | GPAI enforcement from Aug 2 2026 | Art. 50 transparency in effect. Under the Digital Omnibus agreement, Annex III high-risk moves to Dec 2027 and Annex I to Aug 2028. |
| ISO/IEC 42001 / 42005 | 2023 / 2025 | AI management system; AI impact assessment |
- OMB M-26-05 (Jan 2026): federal procurement moved from signed SSDF attestation to risk-based validation.
03SSDLC phase map
- 10 phases: P0–P9.
- AI-specific additions to the SSDF lifecycle: P3 Data & model sourcing; agent and tool controls in P2, P7 and P8.
- d = draft.
P0Governcontinuous
P1Plan & require
P2Design & threat model
P3Data & model sourcingAI-specific
P4Developendpoint + code
P5Build & CI/CD
P6Test & verifyadversarial testing
P7Release & deploy
P8Operate & monitorruntime
P9Respond & improve
| Phase | Control objective | NIST | CISA / gov | OWASP | Other | Tool coverage areas |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| P0 Govern | AI and AppSec policy, roles, AI inventory, risk appetite, metrics | SSDF PO.1, PO.2, PO.6d; AI RMF GOVERN 1.x, 6.x; IR 8596d | Secure by Design principles; M-26-05 inventory duty | SAMM Governance | ISO 42001; EU AI Act GPAI and Art. 50 | AI inventory & risk tiering, AI-SPM discovery feed, regulatory mapping |
| P1 Plan & require | Classify each use case (predictive, GenAI, agent). Set security requirements for AI, agents and third-party models. | SSDF PO.1.1–1.3 (218A PO.1.3); AI RMF MAP 1.1, 2.x, 4.1; AI 600-1 risk list | Agentic guidance: start with low-risk tasks | ASVS 5.0; LLM06 / ASI03 drive scoping | ISO 42005 impact assessment | Requirements templates, third-party AI risk intake |
| P2 Design & threat model | Threat model the app, model, data, agents and tools. Design zero-trust identity and an instruction hierarchy. | SSDF PW.1, PW.2; AI 100-2 E2025; SP 800-207/207A; 800-53 SA-8, SA-17, AC-6 | Careful Adoption of Agentic AI (design); Deploying AI Systems Securely | LLM01/06/07/08; ASI01/03/07/08/09; MCP02/07/10 | MITRE ATLAS | AI threat-modeling tools, agent identity design, MCP gateway architecture |
| P3 Data & model sourcing | Data provenance and poisoning checks; protect weights and training data; vet pre-trained models and MCP servers. | 218A PW.3.1–3.3, PS.1.2, PS.1.3; AI RMF MAP 4.1, MANAGE 3.2 | AI Data Security; AI SBOM elements | LLM03, LLM04; ASI04, ASI06; MCP03, MCP04 | CycloneDX ML-BOM; SPDX 3.0 AI / Dataset | Model scanning, AIBOM, dataset provenance, MCP registry vetting |
| P4 Develop | Secure coding (human and AI-generated), secret hygiene, safe defaults, output handling, a controlled developer endpoint | SSDF PO.3, PO.5, PW.4–PW.6, PW.9; 218A PO.5.3; 800-53 SI-10 | Secure by Design: eliminate vulnerability classes | ASVS V1/V2/V4/V8/V15; LLM05; ASI05; MCP01/05 | OpenSSF Scorecard | IDE/extension control, package firewall, pre-commit secrets and SAST, coding-agent policy |
| P5 Build & CI/CD | Hardened pipeline, provenance, signing, SBOM and AIBOM, dependency control | SSDF PS.1–PS.3; SP 800-204D; 800-53 SR-3/4/11, CM-14, SI-7 | 2026 SBOM minimum elements; AI SBOM elements | CICD-SEC-1…10; SCVS | SLSA v1.2; Sigstore | SCA, malicious-package detection, SBOM, runner hardening, provenance, ASPM |
| P6 Test & verify | SAST, DAST and SCA, plus AI adversarial testing, agent-hijacking tests and guardrail validation | SSDF PW.7, PW.8; 218A PW.3.3; AI RMF MEASURE 2.7; CAISI method; 800-53 SA-11, RA-5 | Agentic guidance: adversarial testing during development | AI Testing Guide; GenAI Red Teaming Guide; LLM Top 10; ASI Top 10 | ATLAS TTPs | AI red teaming platform, MCP dynamic testing, DAST/API, AI pentest |
| P7 Release & deploy | Gated release, staged rollout, rollback, guardrails, least-privilege agent credentials | SSDF PS.4d, PW.9; 800-53 SI-2, SI-7; 800-207A | Deploying AI Systems Securely: validate before use | ASI02/03; MCP02/07/09; LLM10 | SLSA verification at admission | Admission policy, AI firewall, MCP gateway, agent identity and OBO authorization |
| P8 Operate & monitor | Runtime protection, drift, agent telemetry, abuse detection, deception | 218A PO.5.3; AI RMF MANAGE 4.1; 800-53 SI-4, AU-2, AU-12, CA-7 | Agentic guidance: logging and anomaly monitoring | MCP08; ASI08/10; LLM09/10; CICD-SEC-10 | ATLAS detections | Agent detection & response, agent observability, AI SOC, honeytokens, continuous red teaming |
| P9 Respond & improve | Vulnerability intake, AI-aware scoring, patch SLAs, root cause, disclosure | SSDF RV.1–RV.3, PO.6.3d; AI RMF MANAGE 4.3; 800-53 IR-4, SI-2 | BOD 26-04; KEV; Secure by Design VDP | AIVSS; SAMM Incident Mgmt | EU AI Act incident reporting | VM and patch automation, remediation ops, AI incident playbooks |
- P3 Data & model sourcing: separate phase; contains 218A PW.3, PS.1.2, PS.1.3, CISA AI Data Security, LLM04 and ASI06.
- Agent and MCP identity: placed in P2 (design). Government sources: CISA agentic guidance (May 2026), SP 800-207A. NCCoE agent identity: concept paper (Feb 2026). COSAiS agent overlays: no draft.
04Security tool coverage catalog
- 69 capabilities, domains A–J.
- Filters: keyword, maturity, new vs extend, priority.
- D1 (adversarial testing): detailed in doc 2.
69
capabilities, 10 domains
40
New tool categories; 29 Extend
42
P1 (next 12 months)
12
Gap maturity (no mature product category)
- Maturity: Mature several products · Emerging products under 3 years old or consolidating · Gap DIY or immature OSS.
- New / Extend: New new tool category · Extend existing control extended to AI assets.
- Priority: P1 next 12 months · P2 12–24 months · P3 opportunistic.
| ID | Capability | Threat / purpose | Phase | Framework anchors | Representative vendors / OSS | Maturity | New / Extend | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A · Developer endpoint & IDE | ||||||||
| A1 | IDE extension allowlisting & private marketplace | Malicious or hijacked VS Code/Open VSX extensions (GlassWorm). Cursor and Windsurf use Open VSX. | P4 | SSDF PO.3, PO.5; 800-53 CM-7; ASI04 | Microsoft VS Code Private Marketplace + extensions.allowed; Palo Alto (Koi) Agentic Endpoint Security; Socket (Secure Annex) | Emerging | New | P1 |
| A2 | Extension, plugin & agent-skill reputation scanning | Unscanned agent skills, plugins and rules-file packs; transitive extension dependencies | P4 | ASI04; MCP04; CICD-SEC-3 | Socket; Palo Alto (Koi); StepSecurity Dev Machine Guard | Gap | New | P1 |
| A3 | AI coding-assistant policy enforcement | Uncontrolled agent permissions, auto-run, unapproved MCP servers and models on developer machines | P4 | ASI02, ASI03; CISA agentic guidance (least privilege) | Claude Code managed settings / managed MCP; GitHub Copilot enterprise policy; Cursor enterprise; delivered by MDM | Emerging | New | P1 |
| A4 | Repo-borne prompt-injection scanning | Hidden instructions in AGENTS.md, .cursorrules, issues and docs feeds that hijack coding agents (rules-file backdoor, ContextCrush) | P4 | LLM01; ASI01; MCP06 | Pillar (AI coding agents); Snyk agent-scan; custom Semgrep rules | Gap | New | P1 |
| A5 | Package firewall / curated registry proxy | Developers pulling packages straight from npm/PyPI; worm-propagated malware (Shai-Hulud) | P4–P5 | SSDF PW.4; 800-53 SR-3, SR-11; CICD-SEC-3 | JFrog Curation; Sonatype Repository Firewall; Socket Firewall (sfw); Chainguard Libraries | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| A6 | Block direct internet software downloads & app allowlisting | Unvetted binaries, CLIs, model files and AI desktop apps installed from the internet | P4 | 800-53 CM-7(5), CM-11; SSDF PO.5 | macOS: Santa / Jamf Protect; Windows: App Control for Business (WDAC); EDR application control; SSE download policy (Zscaler, Netskope) | Mature | Extend | P2 |
| A7 | Pre-commit secret scanning | API keys (especially AI provider keys) committed to repos; harvested by worms | P4 | SSDF PS.1; CICD-SEC-6; MCP01 | gitleaks; GitGuardian ggshield; TruffleHog; GitHub push protection | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| A8 | IDE / pre-commit SAST | Vulnerable code from humans and AI assistants caught before review | P4 | SSDF PW.7; ASVS | Semgrep; Snyk; Endor Labs AURI (MCP to agents); GitHub Copilot Autofix | Mature | Extend | P2 |
| A9 | Endpoint AI agent & local MCP inventory | Shadow MCP servers over stdio bypass network gateways; unknown AI clients | P4, P8 | MCP09; ASI04 | Runlayer AI Watch; Noma endpoint; StepSecurity Dev Machine Guard; Snyk agent-scan | Emerging | New | P1 |
| A10 | Developer credential hardening | Long-lived tokens in ~/.npmrc, .env and cloud CLIs; AI keys exfiltrated by s1ngularity-style payloads | P4 | CICD-SEC-6; 800-53 IA-5 | 1Password / Vault dev secrets; short-lived SSO-backed CLI credentials; Aembit | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| A11 | Isolated dev environments for coding agents | Coding agents running with full laptop privileges and network access | P4 | ASI05; CISA agentic guidance | Dev containers / GitHub Codespaces; E2B; Daytona; agent sandbox modes | Emerging | New | P2 |
| B · Code, composition & artifacts | ||||||||
| B1 | SAST incl. AI-native code review | Logic and authorization flaws in high-volume AI-generated code | P4–P6 | SSDF PW.7; 800-53 SA-11 | Semgrep; Snyk; Checkmarx; Veracode; GitHub CodeQL; Corgea; DryRun; OpenAI Codex Security | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| B2 | Secrets scanning (history + push protection) | Secrets across repo history, CI logs and container layers | P4–P5 | CICD-SEC-6; MCP01 | GitHub Secret Protection; GitGuardian; TruffleHog | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| B3 | SCA with reachability | Known-vulnerable dependencies; triage overload from AI-scale CVE volume | P5 | SSDF PW.4, RV.1; 800-53 RA-5 | Endor Labs; Snyk; Socket (Coana); GitHub Dependabot; Aikido | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| B4 | Malicious package detection | Typosquats, account takeovers, self-propagating worms | P4–P5 | CICD-SEC-3; SR-11 | Socket; JFrog Xray; Sonatype; Veracode (Phylum) | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| B5 | OSS inclusion & license policy | Unapproved OSS and model licenses (including model weights' terms of use) | P1, P5 | SSDF PW.4; SCVS V5 | Sonatype; FOSSA; Snyk; Black Duck | Mature | Extend | P2 |
| B6 | SBOM generation & management | Inventory and continuous vulnerability matching; CISA 2026 minimum elements | P5, P9 | SSDF PS.3.2; CISA 2026 SBOM; SCVS V2 | Syft/Grype (Anchore); cdxgen; OWASP Dependency-Track | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| B7 | AIBOM / ML-BOM | Inventory of models, datasets, adapters, prompts, MCP servers and agent configs | P3, P5 | 218A PS.3.2; CISA/G7 AI SBOM; CycloneDX ML-BOM; SPDX 3.0 AI | Cisco AI Defense (AI BOM); Snyk Evo AI-BOM; Mindgard; Cranium; Wiz AI-SPM | Gap | New | P2 |
| B8 | Model file scanning & model signing | Pickle / serialization payloads, backdoored or swapped weights from public hubs | P3, P5 | 218A PS.1.3; Deploying AI Systems Securely; LLM03 | Prisma AIRS AI Model Security (Protect AI Guardian); HiddenLayer; JFrog AI Catalog; ModelScan; picklescan; OpenSSF model-signing | Emerging | New | P1 |
| B9 | Dataset provenance & poisoning checks | Poisoned training, fine-tuning or RAG corpora; split-view poisoning | P3 | 218A PW.3.1–3.3; CISA AI Data Security; LLM04; ASI06 | DSPM (Cyera, Varonis) for stores; mostly custom pipelines | Gap | New | P2 |
| B10 | Container & artifact scanning; hardened images | Vulnerable base images and model-serving containers | P5 | SSDF PW.4; 800-53 RA-5 | Chainguard Images; Echo (Minimus); Wiz; Prisma Cloud; Grype | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| B11 | IaC scanning | Misconfigured cloud, GPU and AI services as code | P4–P5 | SSDF PW.9; 800-53 CM-6 | Checkov; Trivy; KICS (KICS and Trivy compromised by TeamPCP, Feb–Mar 2026) | Mature | Extend | P2 |
| B12 | AI-generated code governance | Provenance of AI-authored changes; review policy; agent-authored PRs | P4 | SSDF PO.1; PW.7 | Apiiro; Legit; GitHub rulesets; agent commit attribution | Emerging | New | P2 |
| C · Pipeline (CI/CD) security & observability | ||||||||
| C1 | CI/CD posture & workflow scanning | pull_request_target abuse, unpinned actions, over-scoped tokens | P5 | CICD-SEC-1, 4, 5, 7; Scorecard | zizmor; OpenSSF Scorecard; StepSecurity; Cycode; Legit | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| C2 | Runner hardening & egress control | Secret exfiltration from runners (tj-actions); cache poisoning | P5 | SP 800-204D; CICD-SEC-6, 10 | StepSecurity Harden-Runner; ephemeral self-hosted runners | Emerging | Extend | P1 |
| C3 | Build provenance & signing | Tampered artifacts; OIDC trusted publishing abused by Mini Shai-Hulud | P5 | SLSA v1.2; SSDF PS.2, PS.3; 800-53 SR-4 | Sigstore; GitHub artifact attestations; npm/PyPI trusted publishing; in-toto | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| C4 | Deploy-time admission verification | Unsigned or unprovenanced images and models reaching production | P7 | SSDF PS.2; CM-14; SLSA verify | Kyverno; OPA Gatekeeper; Sigstore policy-controller | Mature | Extend | P2 |
| C5 | Pipeline secrets & OIDC federation | Long-lived cloud and registry credentials in CI | P5 | CICD-SEC-6; 800-53 IA-5 | OIDC to cloud; Vault; GitHub environments | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| C6 | Governance of AI agents inside CI | Prompt injection through PR or issue text into Claude Code Action / Copilot agent, reaching secrets | P5 | ASI01, ASI02; CICD-SEC-4 | Least-privilege tokens + Harden-Runner; no dedicated product yet | Gap | New | P1 |
| C7 | Artifact, model & MCP registry governance | Ungoverned binaries, models and MCP servers entering builds | P3, P5 | SSDF PS.3; SCVS V4 | JFrog Artifactory + AI Catalog + MCP Registry; Sonatype Nexus; Hugging Face Enterprise Hub | Emerging | Extend | P2 |
| C8 | ASPM / risk correlation | Too many findings across too many tools; no code-to-runtime context | P5–P9 | SAMM Defect Mgmt | Apiiro; Cycode; ArmorCode; Legit; Snyk Evo | Mature | Extend | P3 |
| C9 | Pipeline audit & observability | No forensic trail for pipeline compromise | P5, P8 | CICD-SEC-10; 800-53 AU-2 | SCM audit logs to SIEM; StepSecurity; Cribl | Mature | Extend | P2 |
| D · Adversarial testing & verification | ||||||||
| D1 | AI adversarial testing / red teaming | Prompt injection, jailbreak, data exfiltration, tool misuse and goal hijack in LLM apps and agents before release, plus regression on every change | P6, P8 | AI RMF MEASURE 2.7; 218A PW.3.3; CAISI; OWASP AI Testing Guide; GenAI Red Teaming Guide; LLM Top 10; ASI Top 10 | See doc 2: Pillar, Straiker, Mindgard, Repello, Prisma AIRS, Zscaler (SPLX), F5, Cisco; OSS promptfoo, PyRIT, garak, DeepTeam | Emerging | New | P1 |
| D2 | Model evaluation (safety, bias, robustness) | Model selection and model swaps change risk | P3, P6 | AI RMF MEASURE 2.3–2.11; AI 600-1 | Inspect (UK AISI); Giskard; Holistic AI; Arize (Dynatrace); Galileo (Cisco) | Emerging | New | P2 |
| D3 | DAST / API security testing | Classic web and API flaws around the AI app (authz, SSRF, injection) | P6 | SSDF PW.8; ASVS | Burp Suite; StackHawk; Invicti; Salt Security; Akamai API Security | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| D4 | MCP server dynamic testing & fuzzing | Command injection, auth flaws and rug pulls in MCP servers | P3, P6 | MCP03, MCP05, MCP07 | Enkrypt (Anaconda) MCP scan; Cisco MCP Scanner; mcplint / mcpfuzz (immature) | Gap | New | P2 |
| D5 | AI-assisted pentest & exploit validation | Exploitability validation; false-positive reduction | P6, P9 | 800-53 CA-8; RA-5 | XBOW; Codex Security; Mythos-class programs (partner-gated) | Emerging | New | P3 |
| E · Cloud & infrastructure posture | ||||||||
| E1 | CNAPP / CSPM / KSPM | Cloud misconfiguration and toxic combinations | P7–P8 | 800-53 CM-6, RA-5 | Wiz (Google); Cortex Cloud (Palo Alto); Orca; Microsoft Defender for Cloud; Upwind; Sysdig | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| E2 | AI-SPM | Exposed model endpoints, vector DBs and Bedrock/Vertex/Foundry agents; over-permissioned AI identities | P7–P8 | AI RMF MAP 4.1; MCP09 | Wiz AI-SPM; Cortex Cloud AI-SPM; Orca; Defender for Cloud / Agent 365 | Emerging | New | P1 |
| E3 | GPU & model-serving infrastructure hardening | Container escape on shared GPUs (NVIDIAScape), exposed Ray/vLLM/Triton, KV-cache leakage | P7–P8 | 800-53 SC-39, SI-2 | CNAPP runtime agents + vendor patching; no dedicated category | Gap | New | P2 |
| E4 | DSPM for AI data stores | Sensitive data in training sets, RAG indexes and prompt logs | P3, P8 | CISA AI Data Security; LLM02 | Cyera; Varonis; Sentra; Wiz DSPM | Emerging | Extend | P2 |
| F · Runtime AI security | ||||||||
| F1 | AI firewall / guardrails | Prompt injection, jailbreaks, PII and secret leakage, toxic output at runtime | P7–P8 | LLM01, 02, 05; AI RMF MANAGE 2.x | Prisma AIRS; Check Point AI Guardrails (Lakera); Cisco AI Defense; F5 AI Guardrails; CrowdStrike Falcon AIDR; Cloudflare Firewall for AI; NeMo Guardrails; Llama Guard / Prompt Guard | Emerging | New | P1 |
| F2 | LLM / AI gateway | Central routing, keys, rate and cost limits, logging, model allowlist | P7–P8 | LLM10; MCP08 | Portkey (Palo Alto); Kong AI Gateway; Cloudflare AI Gateway; LiteLLM (compromised by TeamPCP, Feb–Mar 2026) | Emerging | New | P1 |
| F3 | Shadow AI & workforce AI usage control | Sensitive data pasted into unsanctioned AI apps; unknown AI SaaS | P8 | AI RMF GOVERN 6.1; LLM02 | SentinelOne (Prompt Security); Harmonic; WitnessAI; Akamai (LayerX); Island; Netskope; Zscaler; Cato (Aim) | Emerging | New | P1 |
| F4 | RAG / vector store access control | Cross-tenant retrieval, embedding inversion, permission-unaware retrieval | P2, P7 | LLM08; ASI06 | Permission-aware retrieval in app code; OpenFGA / Cedar; Pinecone / Weaviate RBAC | Gap | New | P2 |
| G · MCP, gateway & tool governance | ||||||||
| G1 | MCP gateway / proxy | Unauthenticated tools, no audit, no central allow/deny | P7–P8 | MCP02, 07, 08, 09; ASI02 | Docker MCP Gateway; Cloudflare MCP Server Portals; Kong; agentgateway (LF); IBM ContextForge; Microsoft MCP Gateway; Runlayer; Obot; Lasso; Operant | Emerging | New | P1 |
| G2 | Private MCP registry & server vetting | Typosquatted or malicious servers (postmark-mcp); unvetted community servers | P3, P7 | MCP04; ASI04 | JFrog MCP Registry; Docker MCP Catalog; Cisco MCP Catalog; official MCP Registry (subregistry) | Emerging | New | P1 |
| G3 | MCP tool-description scanning & pinning | Tool poisoning; rug pulls (description changes after approval) | P3, P8 | MCP03, MCP06 | Snyk agent-scan; Cisco MCP Scanner; Enkrypt | Emerging | New | P1 |
| G4 | Fine-grained tool-call authorization | Agent calls a permitted tool with harmful arguments or resources | P2, P7 | ASI02, ASI03; MCP02 | Cedar; OpenFGA; Permit.io; Oso; Cerbos (mostly DIY today) | Gap | New | P1 |
| H · Agentic workload security | ||||||||
| H1 | Agent & workload identity | Agents sharing human or service credentials; no attribution | P2, P7 | SP 800-207A; NCCoE agent identity; ASI03 | SPIFFE/SPIRE; Microsoft Entra Agent ID; Okta for AI Agents; Aembit; Astrix (Cisco) | Emerging | New | P1 |
| H2 | On-behalf-of (delegated) authorization | Confused deputy; agents exceed the invoking user's rights | P2, P7 | RFC 8693 token exchange; ID-JAG (draft); ASI03 | Okta Cross App Access (GA Aug 2026); Auth0 for AI Agents; Descope; Entra OBO | Emerging | New | P1 |
| H3 | Secretless credential brokering | Static API keys in agent configs and prompts | P7 | MCP01; CICD-SEC-6 | Aembit; Auth0 Token Vault; Vault dynamic secrets | Emerging | New | P2 |
| H4 | Human-in-the-loop approval for high-impact actions | Irreversible agent actions without consent; human trust exploitation | P2, P7 | ASI09; CISA agentic guidance | OAuth CIBA (Auth0, Descope); framework interrupts (LangGraph, OpenAI Agents SDK) | Emerging | New | P1 |
| H5 | Agent observability & tracing | No evidence trail of prompts, tool calls and decisions | P8 | MCP08; AI RMF MANAGE 4.1; OTel GenAI semconv (still in development) | Langfuse; Arize (Dynatrace); LangSmith; Datadog LLM Obs; OTel | Emerging | New | P1 |
| H6 | Agent detection & response (AIDR) | Goal hijack, rogue agents and anomalous tool chains at runtime | P8 | ASI01, ASI08, ASI10 | Zenity; Noma; Straiker Defend AI; Operant; Pillar; Lasso; CrowdStrike Falcon AIDR | Emerging | New | P1 |
| H7 | Sandboxed code & tool execution | Agent-generated code runs with host privileges (ASI05) | P7–P8 | ASI05; LLM05 | E2B (Firecracker); Modal (gVisor); Northflank; Cloudflare Sandbox; gVisor / Kata / Firecracker | Emerging | New | P1 |
| H8 | Agent egress control | Exfiltration through tool calls, markdown images and URL fetches | P7–P8 | LLM02; ASI02 | SSE / SWG egress policy; sandbox network policy; MCP gateway | Gap | New | P1 |
| H9 | Agent inventory & AgBOM | Agent sprawl across SaaS copilots, frameworks and endpoints | P0, P8 | OWASP Agent Control Standard; MCP09 | Microsoft Agent 365; Zenity; Noma; ServiceNow AI Control Tower | Emerging | New | P1 |
| I · Infrastructure defense | ||||||||
| I1 | Network defense, segmentation & NDR | Lateral movement from compromised agents and inference hosts | P8 | SP 800-207; 800-53 SC-7, SI-4 | Zscaler / Palo Alto / Cloudflare ZT; Illumio; Darktrace; Vectra; ExtraHop | Mature | Extend | P2 |
| I2 | Risk-based vulnerability management | AI-scale CVE volume; prioritization by exposure and KEV | P9 | BOD 26-04; KEV; 800-53 RA-5 | Tenable; Qualys; Rapid7; CrowdStrike Exposure Mgmt | Mature | Extend | P1 |
| I3 | Patch automation & remediation ops | About 5-day time-to-exploit against a 361-day median to remediate half of exposed vulns | P9 | SSDF RV.2; 800-53 SI-2 | Automox; Vicarius vRx; Zafran; Seemplicity; Aikido (Root) backports | Emerging | Extend | P1 |
| I4 | EASM & AI-driven external threat monitoring | Exposed AI endpoints, leaked AI keys, brand and agent impersonation | P8 | 800-53 RA-5(11), SI-4 | CrowdStrike; Palo Alto Cortex Xpanse; Censys; SecurityScorecard; Infoblox | Mature | Extend | P2 |
| I5 | AI deception: honeypots & honeytokens | Detect hijacked agents and AI-driven attackers by planting decoy tools, MCP servers and credentials | P8 | MITRE Engage; ATLAS | Thinkst Canary; Acalvio Deception Guardrails; Tracebit; Beelzebub (OSS LLM/MCP honeypot); Galah | Gap | New | P2 |
| I6 | AI SOC & anomaly detection | Alert volume; machine-speed attacks | P8–P9 | 800-53 IR-4, SI-4 | Dropzone; Prophet; Torq; Exaforce; 7AI; Darktrace; Vectra | Emerging | New | P2 |
| I7 | AI-powered vulnerability discovery (defender use) | Defender-side AI vulnerability discovery | P6, P9 | SSDF RV.1 | Google Big Sleep / CodeMender; XBOW; Codex Security; Project Glasswing (partner-gated) | Emerging | New | P3 |
| J · AI governance & posture | ||||||||
| J1 | AI inventory & risk tiering | Unknown models, agents and AI vendors; inventory drift | P0 | AI RMF GOVERN; ISO 42001; M-26-05 inventory | Credo AI; Cranium; OneTrust; ServiceNow AI Control Tower; Varonis (AllTrue) | Emerging | New | P1 |
| J2 | Regulatory control mapping | EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF and ISO 42001 evidence | P0 | EU AI Act; ISO 42001 / 42005 | Credo AI; Holistic AI; OneTrust | Emerging | New | P2 |
| J3 | AI vulnerability scoring & AI incident response | CVSS does not capture agentic impact; no AI playbooks | P9 | OWASP AIVSS; AI RMF MANAGE 4.3 | AIVSS calculator; SOAR playbooks | Gap | New | P2 |
| J4 | Third-party AI / model provider risk | AI features embedded in SaaS; model provider terms and data use | P1 | AI RMF GOVERN 6.1; 218A PO.1.3 | TPRM suites (OneTrust, Whistic) + AI questionnaires | Emerging | Extend | P2 |
05Funding sequence
| Horizon | Fund | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| 0–6 months | A1/A3/A9 endpoint AI and extension control · A5 package firewall · C1/C2/C6 CI hardening · D1 adversarial testing · G1/G2/G3 MCP gateway, registry and scanning · F3 shadow AI · H5 agent tracing | Incidents in §01: developer endpoints (GlassWorm, Mini Shai-Hulud, s1ngularity), CI (HackerBot-Claw, prt-scan), tool layer (postmark-mcp, ContextCrush). |
| 6–12 months | H1/H2 agent identity + OBO · G4 tool-call authorization · H6 AIDR · H7 sandboxes · F1/F2 runtime guardrails + gateway · E2 AI-SPM · B8 model scanning · I3 patch automation | Depends on 0–6 month inventory and testing. Okta Cross App Access GA Aug 2026; Entra Agent ID GA May 2026. |
| 12–24 months | B7 AIBOM · B9 dataset provenance · D4 MCP fuzzing · E3 GPU hardening · I5 AI deception · J3 AIVSS-based response | Maturity: Gap (B7, B9, D4, E3, I5, J3). Pending standards: AIVSS 1.0 (current v0.8), COSAiS agent overlays (no draft). |
06OWASP LLM Top 10: 2025 → 2026 crosswalk
| 2025 ID | 2025 name | 2026 ID | 2026 name |
|---|---|---|---|
| LLM01 | Prompt Injection | LLM01 | Prompt Injection |
| LLM02 | Sensitive Information Disclosure | LLM02 | Sensitive Information Disclosure |
| LLM03 | Supply Chain | LLM04 | Supply Chain |
| LLM04 | Data and Model Poisoning | LLM05 | Data and Model Poisoning |
| LLM05 | Improper Output Handling | LLM10 | Improper Output Handling |
| LLM06 | Excessive Agency | LLM03 | Excessive Agency |
| LLM07 | System Prompt Leakage | LLM08 | Hidden Context Exposure (renamed, broader scope) |
| LLM08 | Vector and Embedding Weaknesses | LLM09 | Vector and Embedding Weaknesses |
| LLM09 | Misinformation | LLM07 | Misinformation |
| LLM10 | Unbounded Consumption | LLM06 | Unbounded Consumption |
- 2026 edition: published August 2026; rankings weighted partly on incident data.
- IDs used in these docs: 2025 edition, the IDs vendor tooling maps to.
07Sources
- NIST SP 800-218 SSDF
- NIST SP 800-218r1 IPD (SSDF 1.2)
- NIST SP 800-218A
- NIST AI RMF
- NIST AI 100-2 E2025
- NIST SP 800-53 Release 5.2.0
- NIST SP 800-204D
- CAISI agent hijacking evaluations
- NCCoE AI agent identity & authorization
- NIST COSAiS
- NIST Cyber AI Profile
- CISA Secure by Design pledge
- Deploying AI Systems Securely
- Careful Adoption of Agentic AI (Mayer Brown summary)
- CISA 2026 SBOM minimum elements (DevOps.com)
- CISA/G7 AI SBOM elements
- BOD 26-04
- OMB M-26-05
- OWASP LLM Top 10 2025
- OWASP LLM Top 10 2026 (CSA research note)
- OWASP LLM Top 10 2026 (Giskard)
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 2026
- OWASP MCP Top 10
- OWASP AI Testing Guide
- OWASP GenAI Red Teaming Guide
- OWASP AIVSS
- OWASP CI/CD Top 10
- MITRE ATLAS changelog
- SLSA v1.2
- EU AI Act Omnibus (Gibson Dunn)
- GlassWorm / AI supply-chain wave (CSA)
- Mini Shai-Hulud (Akamai)
- s1ngularity (Okta)
- TeamPCP (CSA)
- HackerBot-Claw (Bastion)
- postmark-mcp (Koi)
- EchoLeak CVE-2025-32711
- AI-accelerated vuln discovery & patch debt (CSA)
- VS Code private marketplace
- Palo Alto acquires Koi (Globes)
- Cross App Access convergence (WorkOS)
- MCP spec 2026-07-28
- Cybersecurity M&A roundup Aug 2026 (SecurityWeek)